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Crisis States Programme 
 
The absence of common values and  
failure of common security in Southern Africa, 1992-2003* 
 
Laurie Nathan 
Crisis States Research Centre 
 
This paper seeks to contribute to an inquiry into the factors that affect the viability and 
efficacy of regional organisations in Africa as peacemaking and security forums. The main 
aim of the paper is to explain the Southern African Development Community’s limited success 
in peacemaking and in its efforts to establish a common security regime. Three major 
problems are discussed: the absence of common values among member states, which inhibits 
the development of trust, institutional cohesion, common policies and unified responses to 
crises; the reluctance of states to surrender sovereignty to a security regime that encompasses 
binding rules and decision-making; and the economic and administrative weakness of states. 
These are all national problems that cannot be solved at the regional level. Paradoxically, the 
challenge of common security in Southern Africa is less a regional than a national challenge. 
 
 
Introduction 
The United Nations (UN) encourages the involvement of regional organisations in preventing 
and resolving violent conflict.1 The assumption is that these organisations build trust and 
common values among member states and are well placed to deal with conflict in their own 
neighbourhood. This assumption is not justified by the African experience. The Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have struggled to develop common 
values and to prevent and resolve inter- and intra-state conflict. This case study of SADC 
seeks to contribute to an inquiry into the factors that affect their viability and efficacy as 
peacemaking and security forums.2 The paper also seeks to fill a gap in the academic 
literature on international security, which frequently ignores Southern Africa.3 
 
                                                 
* I wish to thank Chris Ankersen, James Putzel and Herbert Wulf for their detailed comments on earlier drafts of 
this paper. The paper is a revised and updated version of Laurie Nathan, ‘Organ Failure: A Review of the SADC 
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security’, in Liisa Laakso (ed.), Regional Integration for Conflict Prevention 
and Peace Building in Africa: Europe, SADC and ECOWAS, Helsinki: Department of Political Science, 
University of Helsinki, 2002, pp. 62-102. 
1 See, for example, Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for 
Peace, New York: United Nations, 1992, paras 64-65; United Nations, ‘Prevention of Armed Conflict. Report of 
the Secretary-General’, United Nations document A/55/985-S/2001/574, 7 June, 2001, paras 137-142; and 
United Nations, The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in 
Africa. Report of the United Nations Secretary-General to the Security Council, New York: United Nations, 
1998, paras 20-21. 
2 For a critical review of ECOWAS, see Clement E. Adibe, ‘Muddling Through: An Analysis of the ECOWAS 
Experience in Conflict Management in West Africa’, in Laakso (2002), pp.103-169. For a critical review of the 
OAU, see Monde Muyangwa & Margaret A. Vo gt, An Assessment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution, 1993-2000, New York: International Peace Academy, 2000. 
3 For example, between 1998 and 2003 no articles on regional security arrangements in Southern Africa 
appeared in the journals International Security, Survival or Security Dialogue. 
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In 1992 SADC was established as a regional organisation4 with a mandate to promote 
economic integration, poverty alleviation, peace, security and the evolution of common 
political values and institutions.5 There were great expectations that the demise of apartheid 
and the Cold War would usher in a period of sustained stability and development at national 
and regional levels. Yet over the subsequent decade the SADC region remained wracked by a 
high level of conflict that included civil wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
and Angola, state repression in Zimbabwe, and violence in a number of other countries. 
SADC was largely ineffectual in these situations, distinguished less by its peacemaking 
efforts than by its fractious internal quarrels. The formation of the SADC Organ on Politics, 
Defence and Security – a common security regime whose stipulated functions include the 
prevention and resolution of inter- and intra-state conflict – was itself bedevilled by 
acrimonious disputes among member states over a ten-year period. Perversely, a vehicle 
intended to promote confidence had exactly the opposite effect. 
   
Many analysts attribute the difficulty in establishing the Organ to disagreements over its 
status and structure or to competition and animosity between South Africa and Zimbabwe.6 
These diagnoses are superficial and incomplete because they focus only on the manifestations 
of deeper problems. The primary aim of this case study is to identify and explore the 
underlying problems that have inhibited the development of the Organ and prevented SADC 
from playing a useful peacemaking role. It is relevant in this regard that the newly formed 
African Union views SADC and other sub-regional mechanisms for conflict resolution on the 
continent as an integral part of its security architecture.7 A secondary aim of the paper is to 
refute the claim that Southern Africa is moving in the direction of a “security community”.8 
 
Three substantial problems have inhibited the creation of an effective security regime. First 
and most importantly, there is an absence of common values among member states. There are 
two key lines of division in this regard: between democratic and authoritarian tendencies in 
the domestic policies of states, and between pacific and militarist orientations in their foreign 
policies. As in the case of Europe, a viable regional organisation with a political and security 
mandate (hereafter “regional organisation”) can institutionalise the common values of its 
members, develop common policies and contribute to peace and stability. 9 The main 
                                                 
4 In the terminology of the UN, SADC is a “sub-regional organisation”. It describes itself as a “regional 
organisation”, the term used in this paper. 
5 In 2003 the members of SADC were Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
6 See, for example, Mark Malan, ‘Regional Power Politics under Cover of SADC – Running Amok with a 
Mythical Organ’, Institute for Security Studies Paper, 35 (October 1998); Asher Walter Tapfumaneyi (Lt. Col.), 
‘Regional Security Cooperation in Southern Africa: A View from Zimbabwe’, Global Dialogue, 4:2 (August 
1999), pp.23-26; Balefi Tsie, ‘Regional Security in Southern Africa: Whither the SADC Organ on Politics, 
Defence and Security?’, Global Dialogue, 3:3 (December 1998), pp.8-10; and Cedric de Conig, ‘Breaking the 
SADC Organ Impasse: Report of a Seminar on the Operationalisation of the SADC Organ’, ACCORD (African 
Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes) Occasional Paper, 6 (1999). 
7 See Article 16 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African 
Union, 2002. 
8 Writers who make this claim include Naison Ngoma, ‘SADC: Towards a Security Community?’, African 
Security Review, 12:3 (2003), pp.17-28; Maxi van Aardt, ‘The Emerging Security Framework in Southern 
Africa: Regime or Community?’, Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 19:1 (May 1997), pp.1-30; and Fredrik 
Söderbaum, ‘The New Regionalism in Southern Africa’, Politeia, 17:3 (1998), pp.79-80. Söderbaum limits his 
claim to inter-governmental relations. 
9 See, for example, Sten Rynning, ‘Providing Relief or Promoting Democracy? The European Union and Crisis 
Management’, Security Dialogue , 32:1 (2001), pp.87-101; and Connie Peck, ‘The Role of Regional 
Organizations in Preventing and Resolving Conflict’, in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson & Pamela Aall 
(eds.), Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict , Washington, DC: United States 
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argument of this paper, however, is that the viability of such organisations depends in the first 
instance on the existence of common values. In developing this argument I distinguish 
between the external and internal logic of a regional organisation. The external logic, which is 
strong in Southern Africa, refers to the objective conditions that make the organisation a 
beneficial venture in the assessment of member states. The internal logic, which is absent in 
the case of SADC, refers to the normative congruence in the policies of member states that 
enables these states to engage in close political and security co-operation. In the absence of 
sufficient congruence, states are unable to resolve or transcend their major disputes, achieve 
cohesion and act with common purpose in crisis situations.  
 
The second major problem is that SADC states are loathe to surrender a measure of 
sovereignty to a security regime that encompasses binding rules and the possibility of 
interference in domestic affairs. This reluctance stems from the political weakness of states 
and the lack of common values, mutual trust and a shared vision of the regime. The third 
critical problem is that the region is characterised by small economies, underdevelopment and 
weak administrative capacity, which undermine the effectiveness of all SADC’s forums and 
programmes. I conclude that the problems relating to common values, sovereignty and weak 
states cannot be solved at the regional level. The capacity and orientation of a regional 
organisation derive from the capacity and orientation of its members. The challenge of 
common security in Southern Africa is thus less a regional than a national challenge.   
 
In the discourse of SADC, “security” has different meanings depending on the context. It 
refers variously to stability within and between states, the security of states and of people, and 
the military and non-military dimensions of security. “Common security” is the conceptual 
platform of the Organ and reflects the Palme Commission’s thesis that states are 
interdependent and more likely to obtain security through political co-operation than military 
competition. 10 A “security regime” can be defined as a set of principles, rules, norms and 
decision-making procedures that constitute institutionalised co-operation and permit states to 
exercise restraint in the belief that others will reciprocate.11 According to Karl Deutsch and 
his colleagues, a “security community” exists where a group has attained a level of integration 
and sense of community strong enough for its members to enjoy a “real assurance” that their 
disputes will be settled other than through fighting. 12  
 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the key institutional developments 
relating to SADC’s focus on peace and security between 1992 and 2003; Section 3 examines 
SADC’s response to high- intensity conflict; and Section 4 explores the reasons for the 
impasse around the Organ. It should be noted that research on the Organ is constrained by the 
paucity and uninformative nature of official documents in the pub lic domain. SADC states 
place a premium on maintaining a posture of unity and solidarity, and they are overly 
sensitive about the confidentiality of security and defence issues. They are therefore 
                                                                                                                                                        
Institute of Peace Press, 2001, pp.561-583. For a general assessment of the efforts of regional organisations to 
develop institutionalised norms and maintain peace and security, see Peck (2001). 
10 Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, Common Security: A Programme for 
Disarmament, London: Pan, 1982. For a review of the literature on common security, see Andrew Butfoy, 
Common Security and Strategic Reform: A Critical Analysis, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997. 
11 See Robert Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1983, pp.173-194; and Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: 
Regimes as Intervening Variables’, in Krasner (1983), pp. 1-21.  
12 Karl W. Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the 
Light of Historical Experience, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, pp.5-7. See further Emanuel Adler 
& Michael Barnett (eds.), Security Communities, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
 4
disinclined to disclose their decisions and disagreements on these issues. SADC 
communiqués on the Organ and on conflicts in the region consequently tend to be sanitised 
and misleading.13 The ensuing research difficulties are mitigated to some extent by my 
involvement in official efforts to set up a common security regime in Southern Africa.14 
 
Institutional Developments on Peace and Security 
The era of promise, 1992-1994 
In 1980 the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) was formed 
with the objectives of promoting regional co-operation through joint development projects, 
mobilising development assistance and reducing the economic dependence of member states 
on apartheid South Africa.15 In August 1992, as the era of apartheid and the Cold War drew to 
a close, the members of SADCC dissolved the organisation and concluded a treaty 
establishing SADC as an international body with a legal persona. SADC differs from SADCC 
in three major respects: it includes the regional power, South Africa; its primary goal goes 
beyond economic co-ordination to encompass regional integration; and its mandate extends to 
the political and security spheres.  
 
The decision to replace SADCC with SADC and broaden the organisation’s mandate and goal 
was based on four considerations.16 First, there was deep concern about the growing 
marginalisation of sub-Saharan Africa. In light of the emerging global trend towards regional 
integration, it was hoped that a process of this kind would strengthen the position of SADC 
states in international trade and political affairs. Second, Southern Africa was stricken by a 
host of socio-economic problems that transcended borders, afflicted all states and could not be 
addressed adequately at the national level. Third, the ending of the Cold War had led to the 
cessation of Superpower contestation in the region, an attenuation of ideology as a source of 
tension between and within states, and widespread acceptance of multi-party political 
systems. Many of the protracted historical conflicts had consequently been resolved or were 
in the process of being settled: Namibia had attained independence; Cuban and South African 
troops had withdrawn from Angola; a cease-fire had been reached in Mozambique; and 
democratic elections were held for the first time in several countries. Most importantly, the 
demise of apartheid in South Africa had removed the major source of regional strife and 
created the possibility of an inclusive regional body. 17 Fourth, these positive trends had not 
obviated the need for a forum for conflict prevention and resolution. The civil war in Angola 
resumed in 1992 and other transitions to democracy were still fragile. At its inception, SADC 
declared that institutional arrangements were required to ensure political stability and mutual 
security as critical components of regional co-operation and integration. 18   
 
                                                 
13 For examples of this tendency, see Asher Walter Tapfumaneyi (Lt. Col.), ‘The SADC Organ on Politics, 
Defence and Security: Interpreting the Decision of the Maputo 1997 SADC Summit’, ACCORD Occasional 
Paper, 9 (1999). 
14 I served as a part-time advisor on regional security to the SADC Executive Secretary in 1994-6; the South 
African Deputy Minister of Defence in 1994-1999; and the Foreign Minister of Swaziland in 1999-2000.  
15 See Kato Lambrechts, ‘The SADC’s Origins’, in The IGD Guide to the Southern African Development 
Community, Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue, 2001, pp. 22-27.  
16 See SADCC, Theme Document of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, Maputo, 
January 1992; and Towards the Southern African Development Community: A Declaration by the Heads of State 
or Government of Southern African States, Windhoek, 1992. 
17 On the destruction wrought by South Africa’s policy of regional destabilisation in the 1980s, see Joseph 
Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, London: Catholic Institute for International Relations & David Curry, 1986. 
18 Towards the Southern African Development Community, pp. 9-10. 
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Article 5 of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community of 1992 (hereafter 
the “SADC Treaty”) provides that the organisation’s objectives include self-sustaining 
development, economic growth and poverty alleviation; the evolution of common political 
values and institutions; the promotion and defence of peace and security; complementarity 
between national and regional strategies and programmes; the maximisation of productive 
employment and utilisation of resources; and sustainable use of natural resources and 
protection of the environment. Article 4 of the Treaty stipulates that SADC and its members 
must act in accordance with the principles of sovereign equality of member states; solidarity, 
peace and security; human rights, democracy and the rule of law; equity, balance and mutual 
benefit; and peaceful settlement of disputes.  
 
The highest decision-making body of SADC is the Summit, comprising heads of state or 
government. The Chair of the Summit rotates among member states. The Treaty also provides 
for a Council of Ministers to advise the Summit on overall policy and oversee the functioning 
of the organisation; a Tribunal to adjudicate disputes; an Executive Secretary appointed by the 
Summit; and a Secretariat that is located in Gaborone, Botswana. Article 22 of the Treaty 
requires member states to conclude protocols spelling out the objectives, scope and 
institutional means of co-operation and integration in seven designated sectors, one of which 
deals with peace and security. 19 Following approval by the Summit, the protocols must be 
ratified by member states. Up until 2001 co-ordination of the sectors, other than in the case of 
peace and security, was undertaken by individual states on a decentralised basis. 
  
Between 1992 and 1994 the formulation of regional policy on peace and security was driven 
by the Secretariat. SADC’s 1993 Framework and Strategy document, prepared by the 
Secretariat, called for the forging of common political values based on democratic norms, the 
creation of a “non-militaristic security order” and the establishment of procedures for conflict 
avoidance, management and resolution. The document highlighted the need to address non-
military sources of conflict and threats to human security, such as underdevelopment and 
abuse of human rights. The proposed strategies and mechanisms included a forum for 
mediation and arbitration; the ratification by states of key principles of international law; a 
non-aggression treaty; non-offensive defence doctrines; democratic civil-military relations; 
and reductions in military force levels and spending. 20  
 
The key event in this period was the Ministerial Workshop on Democracy, Peace and 
Security, convened by the Secretariat in July 1994 in Windhoek, Namibia. The workshop was 
attended by ministers, officials, parliamentarians and members of non-governmental 
organisations. It recommended to the Summit the adoption of the anti-militarist agenda 
outlined above, the preparation of a protocol on peace, security and political co-operation, the 
establishment of a SADC Sector on Conflict Resolution and Political Co-operation, and the 
creation of an independent human rights commission. 21 Subsequent to this workshop, 
parliamentarians and non-governmental organisations were excluded from official 
deliberations on regional security and in 1999 the Secretariat itself was excluded from the 
finalisation of the protocol governing the Organ. 
                                                 
19 Article 21 of the Treaty lists these sectors as food security, land and agriculture; infrastructure and services; 
industry, trade, investment and finance; human resources development, science and technology; natural 
resources and environment; social welfare, information and culture; and politics, diplomacy, international 
relations, peace and security. 
20 SADC, Southern Africa: A Framework and Strategy for Building the Community, Harare, January 1993, pp. 
24-26. 
21 SADC Secretariat, ‘Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security. Workshop Resolutions. Windhoek, 
Namibia, 11-16 July 1994’, unpublished document.  
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Unhappy with the Windhoek recommendations, the Frontline States coalition proposed the 
formation of a new entity, the Association of Southern African States (ASAS), to serve as the 
regional security body. 22 Whereas the SADC Sector was envisaged as a formal structure 
linked to the Secretariat, ASAS would function independently of the Secretariat and have an 
informal and flexible modus operandi.23 In August 1994 the Summit approved the creation of 
a Sector on Politics, Diplomacy, International Relations, Defence and Security, and requested 
foreign ministers to harmonise the proposals of the Frontline States and the Windhoek 
workshop.24 It appeared at the time that a consensus prevailed on the principles, objectives 
and strategies of the security forum and that the issues in contention were limited to its status, 
structure and procedures. In retrospect it is clear that consensus on the core values and 
methods had not been achieved. As discussed further below, many states did not in truth 
support the anti-militarist stance of the Secretariat and the democratic norms espoused in the 
SADC Treaty. Although the ASAS option was eventually rejected, antagonistic and 
recriminatory debates around the security body’s status and structure persisted over the next 
seven years as manifestations of underlying political and strategic differences among member 
states.  
 
In 1994 the Frontline States was dissolved and its Inter-State Defence and Security 
Committee (ISDSC) was reconstituted to include all the SADC countries. In the post-
apartheid period the ISDSC’s mandate has been to promote security and defence co-operation 
through sub-committees comprising ministers and officials responsible for defence, policing 
and intelligence.25 The ISDSC has pursued this mandate mainly in respect of the armed forces 
and at a technical rather than a political level. Police collaboration has occurred principally 
through the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation 
(SARPCCO), which has functioned independently of SADC and the ISDSC.26 The 
intelligence agencies prefer bilateral co-operation to multilateral forums.27 
 
 The era of institutional conflict, 1995-2003 
At its annual meeting in 1995 the Summit was unable to resolve the disputes around the 
regional security forum. The deadlock was linked to Zimbabwe’s insistence that ASAS 
should follow the tradition of the Frontline States and be chaired on a permanent basis by the 
longest-serving head of state in the region, namely President Mugabe; other countries 
preferred the option of a rotating chair.28 Mugabe was reportedly piqued that his seniority and 
leading role in regional politics was being undercut by the emerging dominance of post-
apartheid South Africa and the international stature of its new president, Nelson Mandela.29 
                                                 
22 The Frontline States coalition was established in 1976 with the initial aim of securing the liberation of 
Zimbabwe and a subsequent focus on Namibian independence and regional destabilisation by Pretoria. By the 
early 1990s its members included Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
23 See Aziz Pahad, ‘Regional Security in Southern Africa’, ISSUP (Institute for Strategic Studies, University of 
Pretoria) Bulletin , 5/95 (1995). 
24 Pahad (1995), p.3.  
25 See Jakkie Cilliers, ‘The Evolving Security Architecture in Southern Africa’, African Security Review,  4:5 
(1995), pp.41-45. 
26 See D.J.M. Bruce, ‘The Role and Achievements of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation 
Organisation’, ISSUP Bulletin, 4/98 (1998). 
27 Author’s informal discussions with South African intelligence officers in 2000. 
28 Cilliers (1995), p.41. 
29 Cilliers (1995), p.41. See also Agostinho Zacarias, ‘Redefining Security’, in Mwesiga Baregu & Christopher 
Landsberg (eds.), From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges, Boulder & London: 
Lynne Rienner, 2003, p.37.  
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In June 1996 the Summit launched the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. The 
official communiqué listed the body’s principles and objectives, which were later included 
with only a few changes in the Organ protocol (see section 2.3 below).30 The organisational 
arrangements were presented as follows: the Organ will operate at summit, ministerial and 
technical levels; it will function independently of other SADC structures; it will incorporate 
the ISDSC; its Chair will rotate annually among member states; and the Chair will serve on a 
Troika basis, meaning that he or she must act in consultation with the outgoing Chair and the 
incoming Chair for the following year. The Summit appointed Mugabe as the first Chair of 
the Organ.  
 
The Summit’s decisions generated a great deal of confusion and tension in subsequent years. 
This was partly because the launch of the Organ was premature. The de jure establishment of 
this body required a protocol approved by the Summit and ratified by two-thirds of the SADC 
states, a process that had not been completed by 2003. Nor, for some years, did the body exist 
de facto: none of its envisaged structures was set up, the ISDSC remained an independent 
forum, and the Organ Chair did not rotate annually and function on a Troika basis. Further, 
the decision that the Organ would operate at a summit level but independently of other SADC 
structures gave rise to the anomalous prospect of two separate entities at the level of heads of 
state being responsible for addressing conflict. South Africa argued that while this 
responsibility fell within the Organ’s mandate, in terms of the SADC Treaty it was also a core 
function of SADC and therefore of the Summit.31 During his tenure as the SADC Chair, 
Mandela became so exasperated with Mugabe’s rival authority as the Chair of the Organ that 
he threatened to resign if the Organ were not made accountable to the Summit.32 
 
A Zimbabwean official outlined the counter-argument as follows. The leaders of SADC had 
clearly intended to “create a parallel and independent structure from the SADC economic 
forum”. It was therefore “mischievous to engage in superfluous legalese in a bid to imprison 
the SADC Organ in the SADC Treaty”. Given South Africa’s history, moreover, it was 
“morally incompetent to challenge the substance of the Treaty, or to invoke it in a manner that 
defeats its spirit and purpose”. 33 The anomaly of two summits reflected Harare’s view that 
SADC should focus on economic issues and that a revamped version of the Frontline States 
should be responsible for politics, defence and security. SADC was considered an 
inappropriate body to preside over sensitive security matters since it was funded by foreign 
donors.34 
 
By the late 1990s it was also evident that SADC was polarised around incompatible pacific 
and militarist visions of the Organ. One camp, comprising Botswana, Mozambique, South 
Africa and Tanzania, viewed the Organ as a common security regime whose primary basis for 
multilateral co-operation and peacemaking would be political rather than military. 35 The other 
camp, comprising Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, favoured a mutual defence pact and 
prioritised military co-operation and responses to conflict.36 Mugabe stated that he foresaw 
                                                 
30 SADC, ‘Communiqué: Summit of Heads of State or Governments of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC)’, Gaborone, 28 June 1996. 
31 See Horst Brammer, ‘In Search of an Effective Regional Security Mechanism for Southern Africa’, Global 
Dialogue, 4:2 (August 1999), pp.21-22. 
32 See Iden Wetherell, ‘SADC Security Split Threatens’, Mail and Guardian , 17-23 July 1998. 
33 Tapfumaneyi (1999a), pp.25-26. 
34 Tapfumaneyi (1999a), p.26. 
35 See Brammer (1999). 
36 See Tapfumaneyi (1999a). 
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the Organ developing into a “kind of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation for the region”. 37 In 
April 1999 Angola, the DRC, Namibia and Zimbabwe concluded a mutual defence pact 
without official notice to SADC.38 
 
The Summit remained unable to resolve the Organ disputes at its meetings in 1998 and 
1999.39 In late 1999 Albert Shabangu, the Foreign Minister of Swaziland which held the 
rotating Chair of the ISDSC at the time, pursued the matter with a sense of purpose that had 
previously been lacking. In October 1999 and May 2000 he convened two extra-ordinary 
meetings of ISDSC ministers and SADC foreign ministers in order to finalise the Organ 
Protocol. The controversy around the status of the Organ was resolved in favour of this body 
being a SADC structure, subordinate and accountable to the SADC Summit. The pacific camp 
prevailed in the debate on the Organ’s strategic orientation but it was agreed that states would 
later conclude a regional defence pact.  
 
In May 2000 the King of Swaziland presented the draft Protocol on Politics, Defence and 
Security Co-operation to Mugabe in the latter’s capacity as the Chair of the Organ. In August 
2001, after a further fifteen months of procrastination and behind-the-scenes wrangling, the 
Summit approved the Protocol at its meeting in Blantyre, Malawi, and appointed President 
Chissano of Mozambique as the new Chair of the Organ. The Summit also consolidated a far-
reaching plan to restructure SADC by centralising its operations in the Secretariat.40 The 
approval of the plan led to the amendment of the SADC Treaty. The revised Treaty 
reformulates SADC’s objectives, which are described as the Common Agenda of the 
organisation and include the promotion of “common political values, systems and other 
shared values which are transmitted through institutions which are democratic, legitimate and 
effective”. 41 The amended Treaty also provides for the Organ as an institution of SADC.42 By 
the end of 2003, however, the Organ Protocol had not been ratified by a sufficient number of 
states to come into force.43 In August 2003 the Summit approved the Strategic Indicative Plan 
for the Organ and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact. The Pact provides for defence co-
operation and for collective action in response to an armed attack. 
 
The Organ Protocol 
The Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation stipulates the objectives and 
other features of the SADC Organ. It asserts that peace, security and strong political relations 
are critical factors in creating a conducive environment for regional co-operation and 
integration. Their achievement must be pursued through close co-operation on matters of 
politics, defence and security. Such co-operation must at all times promote the peaceful 
settlement of disputes by negotiation, conciliation, mediation or arbitration 
 
                                                 
37 Quoted in ‘Congo Wins Membership in Sudden Expansion of SADC’, SouthScan , 12:33, 12 September 1997, 
p.258. 
38 See Iden Wetherell, ‘Mugabe Forms New Defence Pact’, Mail and Guardian , 16-22 April 1999. 
39 For further details on the developments described thus far, see the articles cited in note 6 above.  
40 See Jan Isaksen & Elling N. Tjonneland, Assessing the Restructuring of SADC – Positions, Policies and 
Progress, Report of the Chr. Michelsen Institute, R 2001:6, December 2001.  
41 Article 5 of the Agreement Amending the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, 2001. 
42 See Articles 9, 10 and 12 of the Agreement Amending the Treaty (2001). 
43 Article 21 of the Agreement Amending the Treaty (2001) provides that SADC protocols come into force after 
the deposit of the instruments of ratification by two-thirds of the member states. According to the website of the 
Institute for Security Studies (www.iss.co.za) on 22 March 2004, as at 15 December 2003 the Protocol had been 
ratified by eight states and required one additional ratification to come into force. 
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Article 2 provides that the Organ’s general objective is to promote peace and security in the 
region and that its specific objectives are as follows:  
 
· protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability 
arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra- and inter-state conflict, and 
aggression; 
· promote political co-operation among the State Parties and the evolution of common 
political values and institutions; 
· develop common foreign policy approaches on issues of mutual concern and advance 
such policy collectively in international forums; 
· promote regional co-ordination and co-operation on matters related to security and 
defence and establish appropriate mechanisms to this end; 
· prevent, contain and resolve inter-and intra-state conflict by peaceful means; 
· consider enforcement action in accordance with international law and as a matter of 
last resort where peaceful means have failed; 
· promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within the territories 
of the State Parties and encourage the observance of universal human rights as 
provided for in the charters and conventions of the UN and the OAU; 
· consider the development of a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual 
Defence Pact to respond to external military threats; 
· develop close co-operation between police and intelligence services in order to 
address cross border crime and promote a community based approach to domestic 
security; 
· observe and encourage the State Parties to implement UN, African Union and other 
international conventions and treaties on arms control, disarmament and peaceful 
relations between states; 
· develop the peacekeeping capacity of national defence forces and co-ordinate the 
participation of the State Parties in peacekeeping operations; and 
· enhance regional capacity in respect of disaster management and co-ordination of 
international humanitarian assistance. 
 
Articles 3 to 9 deal with structural arrangements. The Organ is an institution of SADC and 
will report to the Summit. There will be a Troika consisting of the Chair of the Organ, the 
outgoing Chair and the incoming Chair for the following year. The Summit will elect the 
Chair from among its members on a rotating basis and for a period of one year, provided that 
neither the Chair nor the Deputy Chair of the Summit may simultaneously be the Chair of the 
Organ. The Organ Chair will report to the Summit, consult with the Troika and be respons ible 
for the overall policy direction of the Organ and the achievement of its objectives. 
 
There will be a Ministerial Committee comprising ministers responsible for foreign affairs, 
defence, policing and intelligence from each of the State Parties. It will report to the Organ 
Chair and co-ordinate the work of the Organ. Reporting to the committee will be an Inter-
State Politics and Diplomacy Committee comprising foreign ministers, and an Inter-State 
Defence and Security Committee comprising ministers responsible for defence, policing and 
intelligence. The latter committee will assume the objectives, functions and structures of the 
pre-existing ISDSC. Each committee will be chaired by a minister from the same country as 
the Chair of the Organ. The SADC Secretariat will provide secretariat services to the Organ.  
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Article 11 deals with the Organ’s international obligations and its functions, jurisdiction, 
methods and procedures. The State Parties must refrain from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, other than for the legitimate 
purpose of individual or collective self-defence against an armed attack. The Organ and all 
parties to a dispute must manage and seek to resolve conflict by peaceful means. Where 
peaceful means of conflict resolution are unsuccessful, the Chair acting on the advice of the 
Ministerial Committee may recommend to the Summit that enforcement action be taken 
against one or more of the disputant parties. The Summit will resort to enforcement action 
only as a matter of last resort and only with the authorisation of the UN Security Council.  
 
The Organ may seek to resolve any significant inter-state conflict between the State Parties or 
between a State Party and another state.  Such conflict includes a conflict over territorial 
borders or natural resources; a conflict in which an act of aggression or other form of military 
force has occurred or been threatened; and a conflict that threatens peace and security in the 
region or in the territory of a State Party that is not a party to the conflict. The Organ may also 
seek to resolve any significant intra-state conflict within the territory of a State Party. Such 
conflict includes large-scale violence between sections of the population or between the state 
and sections of the population, including genocide, ethnic cleansing and gross violation of 
human rights; a military coup or other threat to the legitimate authority of a state; a condition 
of civil war or insurgency; and a conflict that threatens peace and security in the region or in 
the territory of another State Party.  
 
SADC’s Response to Conflict, 1995-2003 
Overview 
Between 1995 and 2003 there were a number of violent conflicts in the SADC region. They 
included the long-running civil war in Angola that ended in 2002 when the leader of Unita, 
Jonas Savimbi, was killed; a rebellion and full-blown war with state belligerents that began in 
the DRC in 1998; election disputes, a mutiny and an external military intervention in Lesotho 
in 1998; a failed secessionist bid in Namibia in 1998/1999; election disputes in Malawi in 
1999; a constitutional crisis in Zambia in 2001; election disputes on the Zanzibar island of 
Tanzania in 2001; and, continuously from early 2000, state repression and vio lence in 
Zimbabwe.44 In 1998 Angola threatened to invade Zambia in order to halt supplies to Unita,45 
and in May 2000 Zambia accused Angola of conducting military attacks on its territory. 
 
In addition to its inability to prevent such conflicts, SADC does not have a record of 
successful peacemaking. In many of the intra-state conflicts it refrained from critical comment 
and diplomatic engagement, treating violence and crises in governance as purely domestic 
affairs. There were several reasons for this. First, states are keen to avoid adversarial relations 
that might jeopardise regional trade and functional co-operation. Second, governments that 
are not fully democratic are naturally unwilling to speak out against neighbouring states that 
engage in undemocratic practices. Third, SADC is determined to maintain a posture of unity 
and solidarity. Forged in the heat of the struggles against colonialism and apartheid, this 
posture militates against public criticism of member states. Most states view criticism as a 
                                                 
44 Reports on these and other conflicts can be found in the bi-weekly publication SouthScan: A Bulletin of 
Southern African Affairs  (http://southscan.gn.apc.org).  
45 This crisis was resolved through the mediation efforts of Albert Shabangu, the Foreign Minister of Swaziland, 
when his country held the chair of the ISDSC. No independent research on the mediation has been published but 
see Albert H.N. Shabangu, ‘Reflections on the Mediation Process on the Conflict between Angola and Zambia: 
Are There Any Practical Lessons for Mediators?’, unpublished paper presented at the Mediation and Negotiation 
Seminar, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, 2 October 2002. 
 11
violation of sovereignty. The imperative of solidarity is greatest when foreign powers raise 
concerns that are perceived or can be portrayed as reflecting a “neo-colonial” agenda.  
 
These dynamics were evident in extremis in the case of state repression and abrogation of the 
rule of law in Zimbabwe.46 Here, far from remaining silent, SADC repeatedly expressed 
solidarity with the Zimbabwe government and condemned the sanctions imposed on it by the 
United States and the European Union (EU).47 In addition to its systematic drive to crush 
domestic opposition, Harare’s efforts to address the gross inequities in land ownership 
resulting from colonial rule were characterised by its flouting of judicial rulings, violence 
perpetrated by state-sponsored militia, the accumulation of farms by the ruling elite, and 
disregard for the plight of dislocated farm workers.48 Reacting to international protests against 
these developments, the ISDSC “expressed serious concern on the continued foreign 
interference in the internal affairs of some Member States, especially in Zimbabwe which has 
embarked on an agrarian reform programme aimed at addressing the problem of poverty”.49 
In 2003 the Ministerial Committee of the Organ “took note that those opposed to Zimbabwe 
have tried to shift the agenda from the core issue of land by selective diversion of attention on 
governance and human rights issues”. 50  
 
The incongruity of SADC’s position was highlighted by its short- lived departure from support 
for Harare in late 2001. In September that year the heads of state comprising the SADC task 
group that had been set up to address the Zimbabwe crisis denounced the decline in the rule of 
law and insisted that the crisis was due to government’s approach to land reform rather than to 
the need for land reform.51 At the Summit meeting in 2002 Mugabe was replaced as the 
Deputy Chair of SADC, preventing him from assuming the Chair the following year.52 At the 
African Union’s Summit meeting in July 2003, however, Mugabe was elected to represent 
Southern Africa as one the Union’s five regional vice-chairpersons. 
 
SADC’s poor record of peacemaking is also attributable to the impasse around the Organ. The 
absence of an agreed set of norms, strategies and procedures for addressing high- intensity 
conflict contributed to collective inertia, divergent and parochial approaches by individual 
states, ill-conceived interventions of doubtful legality, and a confused mixture of 
peacemaking and peace enforcement. Most of these problems were apparent during the crises 
in Lesotho and the DRC in 1998.  
 
                                                 
46 On repression and state-sponsored violence in Zimbabwe, see the reports of the International Crisis Group and 
Amnesty International on their respective websites, www.crisisweb.org and web.amnesty.org.  
47 See, for example, SADC, ‘SADC Heads of State and Government support Zimbabwe’, Windhoek, 7 August 
2000; SADC, ‘Final Communiqué. January 2002 SADC Extra -Ordinary Summit of Heads of State and 
Government’, Blantyre, 14 January 2002, para 19; and SADC, ‘2003 SADC Summit Final Communiqué’, Dar es 
Salaam, 26 August 2003, paras 24 and 25. 
48 See, for example, Human Rights Watch, ‘Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe’, Human Rights Watch 
Report, 14:1(A) (March 2002). On the history of land struggles and inequity in the pre- and post-colonial 
periods, see Tapera Knox Chitiyo, ‘Land Violence and Compensation: Reconceptualising Zimbabwe’s Land and 
War Veterans’ Debate’, Track Two, 9:1 (May 2000). 
49 ISDSC, ‘Final Communiqué. 23rd Session of the Inter State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation’, 
Luanda, 9 August 2002. 
50 SADC Organ, ‘Communiqué of the Third Session of the Committee of Ministers of the Organ on Politics, 
Defence and Security Cooperation’, Harare, 3 April 2003, para 12. 
51 See Marco Granelli, ‘SADC Heads Read Riot Act to Mugabe’, Cape Times, 11 September 2001.   
52 See Manoah Esipisu, ‘Zimbabwe Dropped as Host of 2003 SADC Summit’, Reuters news release, 3 October 
2002. 
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Lesotho and the DRC 
In September 1998 the Prime Minister of Lesotho requested neighbouring states to take 
military action aimed at stabilising a domestic crisis. Against the backdrop of mounting 
dissent over the results of a nationa l election, there were fears of an imminent coup when a 
group of junior officers deposed and imprisoned the commander and other senior members of 
the Lesotho Defence Force. In consultation with Mozambique and Zimbabwe, South Africa 
and Botswana deployed troops in Lesotho on 22 September. The deployment met with 
unanticipated resistance from sections of the Lesotho army. Eight South African soldiers and 
an estimated 58 Basotho soldiers were killed in battles over several days. Anarchy and public 
demonstrations against the intervention ensued, leading to the virtual sacking of the capital 
city, Maseru. The operation was riddled with strategic and tactical errors and was viewed by 
many, including South African army officers, as a military and political disaster.53  
 
In response to widespread criticism, Pretoria insisted that the deployment had been requested 
by the head of a legitimate government facing a potential coup and that the operation had only 
been authorised after efforts to end the mutiny through negotiations had failed.54 South Africa 
based the legality of the intervention on the following factors: the operation took place under 
SADC auspices; it flowed from a SADC decision to not permit coups d’etat and other 
unconstitutional changes of government in Southern Africa; and it was based on a 1994 
agreement that South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana would be guarantors of stability in 
Lesotho.55 A senior defence official in South Africa noted several flaws in this argument: the 
“SADC decision” to not allow coups in the region had in fact been a proposal from the 
ISDSC to the SADC Summit; the proposal had included the proviso that UN, OAU and 
SADC approval be obtained prior to any military intervention; the Summit had neither 
endorsed the ISDSC’s proposal nor authorised military action in Lesotho; and, in the absence 
of Summit approval, the deployment did not comply with SADC’s decision-making rules.56 
Moreover, in the absence of UN Security Council authorisation, the operation was arguably in 
breach of Article 53(1) of the UN Charter. 
 
In 1996 a rebellion in Zaire led to the fall of President Mobuto Sese Seko and the assumption 
of the presidency by Laurent Kabila. The country was renamed the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and became a member of SADC. On 2 August 1998 the Rassemblement Congolais 
pour la Democratie (Congolese Rally for Democracy) launched a rebellion against Kabila 
with the support of Rwanda and Uganda which had helped to bring him to power. Kabila 
appealed to SADC for military and political assistance. On 8 August Mugabe convened a 
meeting in Victoria Falls of heads of state from a number of African countries. Zimbabwe 
excluded South Africa, which held the chair of SADC at the time, because of the tension 
between Mandela and Mugabe over the Organ. 57 On 18 August Mugabe referred the 
recommendations of a task group set up in Victoria Falls to an ISDSC meeting in Harare, at 
the conclusion of which he declared that SADC had decided unanimously to meet Kabila’s 
                                                 
53 See, for example, Malan (1998), pp. 7-8; Francis K. Makoa, ‘Foreign Military Intervention in Lesotho’s 
Elections Dispute: Whose Project?’, Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 21:1 (June 1999), pp.66-87; and 
‘Army Top Brass Slam Incursion into Lesotho’, Star, 1 October 1998. 
54 See Ronnie Mamoepa, ‘Stalemate in Peace Process Led to SADC Intervention’, Sunday Independent, 27 
September 1998. 
55 Mamuepa (1998). See also ‘The SADC Intervention in Lesotho: A Military Perspective’, Salut, South African 
National Defence Force, July 1999, pp.22-29. 
56 Rocky Williams, ‘From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding? South African Policy and Practice in Peace 
Missions’, International Peacekeeping, 7:3 (2000), pp.99-101. 
57 See ‘Foreign Affairs Tries to Deny Mugabe’s Snub’, Southern Africa Report, 16:32 (14 August 1998), pp.4-5. 
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appeal. The following day Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia announced that they would 
deploy troops in the DRC on behalf of SADC.58 
 
The intervening states justified the deployment as an act of collective defence against the 
alleged invasion of the DRC by Rwanda and Uganda. They also claimed that the deployment 
had been authorised by the Organ and the ISDSC. However, the Organ was not operational, 
the ISDSC had no mandate to initiate military action, and only a handful of SADC states were 
present at the meetings convened by Mugabe. Mandela’s spokesperson stated emphatically 
that “there is no way that the people who met at Victoria Falls and Harare can have met under 
the auspices of the SADC”. 59 When Mandela challenged Mugabe’s authority to send troops 
on behalf of SADC, the latter responded with a thinly veiled insult: “No one is compelled 
within SADC to go into a campaign of assisting a country beset by conflict. Those who want 
to keep out, fine. Let them keep out, but let them be silent about those who want to help”. 60  
 
Supported by Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania, South Africa pursued a diplomatic 
solution to the DRC crisis. On 23 August Mandela called an emergency meeting of the SADC 
Summit in Pretoria. Mugabe declined to attend, insisting that “we must now enlist the OAU 
which has an organ for conflict resolution. It is not possible for us to resolve [the crisis] as 
SADC because we are divided”. 61 The Summit declared that military action was an 
unacceptable way of addressing the problems that had given rise to the war. It called for an 
immediate cease-fire and process of dialogue to solve these problems.62 At the Non-Aligned 
Movement’s Summit hosted by South Africa in September, Mandela declared unexpectedly 
that SADC supported the military intervention. The apparent turnabout was intended to ease 
the tension with Mugabe and restore a semblance of unity to SADC;63 for months thereafter, 
South African cabinet ministers insisted that Pretoria would only deploy troops in the DRC 
under UN auspices.64 The SADC Summit meeting in mid-September 1998 also sought to 
present a united front, endorsing the positions represented by both South Africa and 
Zimbabwe.65 President Chiluba of Zambia was mandated to broker a cease-fire and former 
President Masire of Botswana was charged with facilitating an internal dialogue process in 
the DRC. In July 1999 the state belligerents signed the Lusaka Peace Accord, which shifted 
responsibility from SADC to the OAU and the UN. Nevertheless, President Mbeki of South 
Africa played a pivotal role in facilitating the state belligerents’ withdrawal from the DRC in 
2002 and the formation of a transitional government of national unity in that country in June 
2003.66  
 
                                                 
58 The details here and in the following paragraph are drawn from Eric G. Berman & Katie S. Sams, 
Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities, Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament 
Research and Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2000, pp.175-180.  
59 Quoted in ‘The Last Days of Laurent Kabila?’, Mail and Guardian, 21-27 August 1998. 
60 Quoted in United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘DRC: Zimbabwean, Angolan 
Troops Arrive to Back Kabila’, Integrated Regional Information Network bulletin, 21 August 1998. 
61 Quoted in Berman & Sams, (2000), p.178. 
62 SADC, ‘Communiqué of the Summit Meeting of the SADC on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, 
Pretoria, 23 August 1998.  
63 See Berman & Sams, (2000), p.179; and ‘SA Seeks to Recoup Its Diplomatic Losses on Congo Intervention at 
Peace Summit’, SouthScan, 13:18 (4 September 1998), pp.137-138. 
64 See, for example, the comments of the Defence Minister in South African Press Association, ‘Briefing of MPs 
– Safety and Security’, 12 August 1999. 
65 SADC, ‘Communiqué. Mauritius – Grand Bay: 13-14th September, 1998’. 
66 On the fragile peace process and on-going violence in 2003, see Gerrie Swart, ‘Towards Peace in the DRC’, 
Conflict Trends, 2/2003 (2003), pp. 37-42. 
 14
Explaining the failure of the Organ 
Although the tension between South Africa and Zimbabwe undoubtedly contributed to the 
impasse around the Organ, the problems lay much deeper than this. I argue below that 
SADC’s failure to establish a viable security regime was a consequence of fundamental 
political and strategic differences between member states; their reluctance to surrender a 
measure of sovereignty to a security regime; and their economic and administrative weakness.  
 
The internal and external logic of regional organisations 
As noted previously, the UN emphasises the importance of regional organisations in 
maintaining peace within their geographical domains. The core assumption is that these 
bodies can promote trust and develop common values among their members in a fashion that 
mitigates tensions and reduces the possibility of violent conflict. The evolution of common 
values in the interests of peace and security is one of SADC’s primary goals and was part of 
the rationale for its establishment.67 According to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan:  
Regional organisations can contribute to conflict prevention in a number of 
specific ways. Such organisations build trust among States through the frequency 
of interaction, and have a greater grasp of the historical background of a conflict. 
Because of their proximity, regional organisations could, for example, provide a 
local forum for efforts to decrease tensions and promote and facilitate a 
comprehensive regional approach to cross-border issues.68 
The core assumption is not justified in the case of Southern Africa. A viable regional 
organisation might be able to develop common policies and perform a range of security and 
cross-border functions but its members must have sufficient commonality in values if the 
body is to be at all viable. Frequent interaction between member states will not in itself 
overcome divisions and mistrust that derive from incompatible national policies. Common 
values are the foundation rather than the outcome of close political and security co-operation. 
In the absence of political congruence and trust, proximity can be an impediment to 
peacemaking where member states are themselves parties to a conflict. In these situations, as 
has occurred frequently in Africa, the regional body is an arena of disputation rather than 
conflict resolution. 69 In extreme cases, as with SADC and the DRC crisis of 1998, adversarial 
relations between member states can render conflict resolution forums inoperable. The 
ramifications of the argument about common values are explored further below.  
 
In analysing the Organ impasse, it is necessary to distinguish between the internal and 
external logic of a regional organisation as separate requirements for cohesion and 
effectiveness. The external logic refers to the objective conditions that make the organisation 
a beneficial venture in the assessment of member states. These states must believe that their 
interests will be served through institutionalised co-operation and co-ordination in respect of 
one or more problems and goals. The problems and goals naturally differ from one 
organisation to another. 
 
The external logic of SADC has been articulated clearly in official documents and 
encompasses the following concerns and incentives: regionalism as a response to 
                                                 
67 See Article 5(1)(b) of the SADC Treaty (1992); and Towards the Southern African Development Community 
(1992), p.5.  
68 United Nations (2001), para.137. 
69 See Laurie Nathan, ‘When Push Comes to Shove: The Failure of International Mediation in African Civil 
Wars’, Track Two, 8:2 (November 1999). 
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globalisation and Africa’s marginalisation in international trade and politics; the promotion of 
development and economic growth through regional projects and trade; the many socio-
economic problems, including a devastating HIV/Aids pandemic, that transcend national 
borders and require a co-ordinated response; the benefits of co-operation in sectors like water, 
energy, policing, health and transport; the prevalence of domestic conflict that impacts on 
neighbouring states; the utility of a regional forum for conflict resolution; and the 
peacekeeping and confidence-building benefits of defence co-operation. 70 In short, SADC’s 
external logic is captured by its overarching goals of regional integration, economic and social 
development, and peace and stability. More specifically in relation to security, the underlying 
logic is that Southern Africa is a “security complex”, defined by Barry Buzan as “a group of 
states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national 
securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another”.71   
 
The internal logic of a regional organisation refers to the normative congruence in the 
domestic and foreign policies of member states that makes these states willing and able to 
engage in close political and security co-operation. A high level of normative congruence 
engenders the affinity and trust that are essential prerequisites for states to develop common 
policies on a range of sensitive issues, adopt a set of binding principles and rules, and accept 
the resultant constraints on their decision-making and behaviour.  
 
The internal logic is a relative rather than an absolute condition. The members of a regional 
organisation may be willing to accept a set of rules based on common values but they do not 
surrender sovereign decision-making lightly and completely. They invariably encounter 
serious differences of opinion and experience difficulty in collective decision-making on 
policy matters and in crisis situations, leading at times to independent and divergent courses 
of action. Some member states might also deviate occasionally from the agreed rules and 
policies. For the organisation to withstand these differences and deviations, there must be 
sufficient political commonality and trust among its members. In other words, there is a 
minimum threshold of political congruence for a successful regional organisation, below 
which the organisation lacks cohesion and its members are unable to adopt common policies.  
 
The internal logic is also relative in the sense that the degree of congruence required for 
success varies according to the focus, type and form of multilateral engagement. The 
Southern African experience confirms what might be expected in this regard: the threshold is 
lower in non-sensitive areas than in the realm of high politics; it rises in the progression from 
co-operation to co-ordination to integration; and it is higher in a formal regime than in an 
informal association. SADC states have sufficient affinity and trust to co-operate in sectors 
that have political dimensions but are relatively uncontroversial, a good example being their 
functional co-operation on military and police matters through the ISDSC and SARPCCO.72 
In the 1980s the Frontline States coalition achieved cohesion on the basis of its members’ 
common opposition to apartheid and colonialism but it did not seek to regulate their conduct 
through binding rules. 
 
The threshold of political congruence for successful co-operation is much higher in the case 
of a security regime which encompasses principles and rules that are intended to constrain 
                                                 
70 See SADCC (1992), and numerous statements by SADC and its leaders on the SADC website at 
www.sadc.int. 
71 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era  
(2nd edition), Harlow: Longman, 1991, p.190. 
72 See Berman & Sams (2000), pp.167-172. 
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state behaviour and decision-making. If the domestic and/or foreign policies of member states 
are essentially incompatible, the regime is unlikely to be effective for a host of reasons: there 
are no common values on which to base the rules, develop common policies and achieve 
cohesion; the institution will instead be wracked by divisions that inhibit collective decision-
making and action; its members will frequently breach the declared norms that are 
inconsistent with their national policies; and members that are authoritarian will not fulfil a 
mandate to promote democracy and respect fo r human rights. These factors constitute a 
summary description and explanation of the Organ stalemate and SADC’s poor record in 
relation to peacemaking and democratic governance. 
 
The EU illustrates the significance of the internal logic and the proposition that common 
values are the foundation rather than the result of institutionalised political and security co-
operation. Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union states that “the Union is founded on 
the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and 
the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States” (emphasis added). 
Precisely because these assertions are true, the EU has been able to adopt binding rules and 
decisions, establish bodies with supranational authority, and develop policy on numerous 
issues. The organisation draws a crucial distinction between the negotiability of common 
policies and the non-negotiability of the common values that underlie them.73 Article 49(1) of 
the Treaty thus provides that admission to the Union is only open to European states that 
respect the principles set out in Article 6(1). Central and eastern European states would 
consequently not gain admission to the EU on the grounds that they might thereby come to 
accept democratic norms; they would only be admitted if they already adhered to these 
norms.74  
 
By contrast, in 1997 the SADC Summit decided that the DRC satisfied the criteria for 
admission to the organisation. 75 These criteria were not specified in the Summit communiqué 
but they were patently inconsistent with the democratic principles espoused in the SADC 
Treaty and absent in the DRC. The admission decision related instead to the external logic of 
political stability, the DRC’s mineral, water and other natural resources, and the regional 
benefits of its potential hydroelectric power and infrastructural projects.76 Within a year of the 
DRC joining SADC, the crisis in that country had rent the organisation asunder. 
 
Unlike the EU, SADC was not founded on common values. In the realm of domestic policy 
there is no consensus on the basic principles of political governance. In addition to Swaziland 
and the DRC, which are not democratic, there are many de jure democracies whose 
executives are intolerant of dissent, hardly accountable to parliament and insufficiently 
committed to respect for human rights and the rule of law. The SADC Parliamentary Forum, 
an autonomous body comprising parliamentarians from all the SADC states, observes that 
politicians in the region “talk democracy but use undemocratic means to stay in power”.77 
According to Jonathan Moyo prior to his becoming Zimbabwe’s Minister of Information in 
2000, “the assertion that the majority of African governments are now democratic… has no 
empirical basis. It is true that multiparty elections are now common in Africa but this truth 
                                                 
73 See Marise Cremona, ‘Variable Geometry and Setting Membership Conditionalities: A Viable Strategy?’, in 
Christopher Clapham, Greg Mills, Anna Morner & Elizabeth Sidiropolous (eds.), Regional Integration in 
Southern Africa: Comparative International Perspectives, Johannesburg: South African Institute for 
International Affairs, 2001, p.196. 
74 Cremona (2001). 
75 SADC, ‘1997 SADC Summit Communiqué’, Blantyre, 8 September 1997. 
76 SADC (1997), para.15; and ‘Congo Wins Membership’ (1997). 
77 Quoted in South African Press Association, ‘Leaders Should Practice Democracy’, 15 October 2000. 
 17
does not describe a fundamental development. The change is strategic, not substantive. …Just 
look at Zambia and Malawi since the fall of Kenneth Kaunda and the late Kamuzu Banda. 
Zimbabwe is following suit with reckless abandon”. 78 Freedom House surveys of civil and 
political liberties indicate that in 2002 Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa were 
“free”; Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Seychelles, Tanzania and Zambia were “partly free”; 
and Angola, the DRC, Swaziland and Zimbabwe were “not free”. 79  
 
In the realm of foreign policy there is a division between militarist and pacific camps. The 
DRC war revealed the strategic import of this rift, with South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique 
and Tanzania promoting a diplomatic solution while Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola formed 
a military alliance with Kabila. Although South Africa and Botswana intervened militarily in 
Lesotho in 1998, the intervention was not indicative of their foreign policies. The dispute 
around the DRC rebellion, on the other hand, reflected general tendencies, crippled the Organ 
and gave rise to the notion of “two SADCs”. 80 As Walter Tapfumaneyi puts it, “the two 
camps have clearly worked at cross-purposes resulting in either divergent action or no action 
at all in the face of an increasing number of crises”. 81  
 
At an institutional level, the militarist camp emphasises defence co-operation and collective 
security through a mutual defence pact that would lead in time to a Nato-type organisation. 
The pacific camp prioritises political co-operation and diplomatic means of peacemaking 
through a common security regime. More specifically in relation to the Organ, the pacific 
camp wanted foreign ministers to have primary responsibility for peacemaking and the 
militarist camp wanted defence ministers to have equal responsibility and status.82 In a frank 
acknowledgement of the foreign policy division, a Zimbabwean defence official claims that a 
major reason for the Organ impasse was Pretoria’s opposition to the use of armed force in 
peacemaking. He argues that collective military force has been required as a catalyst for 
political solutions in all the conflicts in Southern Africa and “it is therefore superfluous and 
hypocritical for the South African government and its apologists to advocate a strict 
adherence to early warning and diplomatic solutions to SADC conflicts”.83 
 
In 1999 Angola, the DRC, Namibia and Zimbabwe concluded a defence treaty, which 
provides that an armed attack against one of the signatories will be considered an attack 
against the others and that each of them will assist a signatory under attack through such 
action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to repel the attack and restore 
peace and security. 84 The treaty reflects the high level of political congruence and trust 
attained by Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe as a result of their alliance in the Frontline States 
and similar post-liberation policies. Lacking such affinity and unity as a regional body, SADC 
repeatedly deferred and then watered down the regional defence pact. The pact approved by 
                                                 
78 Jonathan Moyo, ‘The African Renaissance: A Critical Assessment’, Southern African Political and Economic 
Monthly , 11:7 (May 1998), pp.9-12. 
79 Cited in Willie Breytenbach, ‘Democracy in the SADC Region: A Comparative Overview’, African Security 
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the Summit in 2003 falls short of a collective defence commitment. It provides that an armed 
attack against one of the state parties shall be considered a threat to regional peace and 
security (rather than an attack on all them), that such attack shall be met with immediate 
collective action as mandated by the Summit, but that each state party shall participate in 
collective action in any manner it deems appropriate.85  
 
Principles of solidarity and anti- imperialism, welded by history, ideology, vulnerability and 
national pride, cut across the regional cleavages described above and are sometimes brought 
strongly into play. Reiterating its opposition to international sanctions against Zimbabwe, for 
example, the Summit “re-affirmed the indivisibility of SADC and solidarity with 
Zimbabwe”.86 Breaking ranks in these circumstances can lead to dramatic vilification. When 
Mbeki issued mild criticisms of Mugabe in late 2001, the state-owned newspaper in Harare, 
the Herald, claimed that he had betrayed the ruling party and joined the “neo-colonialist plot” 
to overthrow it.87 In 2003 Botswana, the SADC country most openly critical of Harare, felt 
obliged to denounce media reports in the region that it was conspiring with the US and Britain 
to launch a military attack on Zimbabwe.88 The principle of solidarity enhances state security 
at the expense of human security, masks rather than transcends the substantive disputes 
between states, and does not constitute a foundation for a common security regime. 
 
Philip Gordon argues that the EU failed to develop an effective and unified security and 
foreign policy in the 1990s because state interests had not converged sufficiently to either 
justify a loss of sovereignty or entail little loss of sovereignty. 89 I have ascribed SADC’s 
failure in this sphere to a divergence of values rather than interests. There is no discernable 
evidence that the pacific and militarist camps in Southern Africa derive from interests 
common to their respective members and different from those of their rivals. SADC countries 
vary markedly in terms of resource, geographic, demographic, economic and security factors, 
giving rise to varying interests, but the variations are much greater within the blocs than 
between them. In the case of the Organ stalemate, states agreed that their interests would be 
served by a security regime but they disagreed for normative reasons on the strategic 
orientation and methods of the regime. In the case of the DRC crisis, Zimbabwe’s militarist 
approach and South Africa’s pacific approach were motivated by a similar combination of 
economic interests and strategic concerns.  
 
Weak states  
African states are weak in various respects and their weakness contributes significantly to 
insecurity and violence at national and regional levels. At the national level, for example, 
resort to violence may be pervasive where the state is unable to meet the basic security needs 
of citizens and manage normal social and political conflict fairly and competently. 90 The 
following discussion focuses on the ways in which the political, economic and administrative 
weakness of SADC states has hindered the creation of a viable security regime.   
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States do not surrender sovereign decision-making lightly in any circumstances. There are 
three additional factors that make Southern African states especially cautious and sensitive. 
First, they guard their sovereignty jealously because many of them attained it relatively 
recently and at great cost through liberation wars. Second, most of them do not enjoy full 
sovereignty in any event: they do not have a monopoly of violence within their territories; 
they do not have adequate control of movement across their borders; their administrative 
reach in rural areas is weak; and their ability to mobilise resources and collect taxes is limited. 
Their national authority is further undermined by the economic and financial dimensions of 
globalisation and by the structural adjustment programmes and other prescriptive policies of 
international financial organisations and foreign donors. States that have weak de facto 
sovereignty are understandably resistant to regional mechanisms that would dilute it further 
through binding rules and decision-making that limit their discretion and heighten the 
possibility of interference in their domestic affairs. Third, however compelling the external 
logic of a regional organisation, it is improbable that states will agree to be bound by rules 
and decision-making in the political and security spheres if they do not support the underlying 
norms and trust each other.  
 
Although SADC has not debated the principle of sovereignty, the views of member states can 
be discerned from official documents. The SADC Treaty, which was concluded in an era of 
emerging democracy and optimism, presents the principle simply as sovereign equality of 
states.91 The Organ Protocol, which was concluded in an era of inter- and intra-state conflict, 
includes in the Preamble the principles of “strict respect for sovereignty”, sovereign equality, 
political independence and non-interference in domestic affairs. The SADC Mutual Defence 
Pact, which was finalised in the midst of the Zimbabwe crisis, contains three substantive 
provisions on non- interference in domestic affairs.92 
 
By way of further example, in 1996 the SADC Secretariat proposed that the Organ be 
mandated to monitor the performance of member states in the fields of human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law. 93 The ministers responsible for preparing the Organ’s terms of 
reference rejected this proposal.94 They were willing though to permit the Organ to monitor 
the ratification by states of UN, OAU and other international conventions and treaties on 
human rights, arms control and disarmament.95 During the finalisation of the Organ Protocol 
in 2000, monitoring even in relation to state ratification of international treaties was deemed 
too intrusive and all references to monitoring were excluded from the provisions dealing with 
these topics. The Summit does not appear to have ever discussed the independent human 
rights commission proposed by the ministerial workshop in Windhoek in 1994. It has also 
delayed the establishment of a supranational Tribunal that might constitute a significant 
challenge to sovereignty. The SADC Treaty of 1992 provides that the Tribunal will not only 
adjudicate upon disputes between states but will also ensure adherence to the provisions of the 
Treaty. The Summit only approved the Protocol on Tribunal and the Rules of Procedure 
Thereof in August 2000, and the body had not been set up by the end of 2003. 
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In addition to these political factors, Southern Africa is characterised by small economies,96 
underdevelopment and weak capacity in the public sector. Governments lack the resources 
and the technical and managerial skills to perform the functions of the state in a satisfactory 
manner. Their weakness undermines SADC in three ways: states that cannot affect proper co-
ordination between their own departments struggle to meet the vastly more complicated 
challenge of co-ordination between countries; states that are unable to attend adequately to 
their domestic priorities devote scant attention and resources to regional projects; and the 
skills deficit impairs the efficacy of all multilateral programmes and forums. Southern African 
leaders are acutely aware of these problems. In 1992 they noted that “the most binding 
constraint to development of the region is inadequate professionally and technically qualified 
and experienced personnel to plan and manage the development process efficiently and 
effectively”.97 In 1995 the Council of Ministers described the region’s capacity constraints as 
follows: “shortages of skilled manpower; poor policy environment; low level of expertise; 
weak institutional capacity; inability for the retention of skills and expertise; [and] lack of 
incentives”. 98 The potential to achieve synergy through regional projects is consequently low. 
 
The problems arising from weak state capacity have been compounded by a long-standing 
aversion to centralised structures at the regional level. In 1981 the SADCC Summit 
proclaimed that it had “eschewed the creation of a large and unwieldy bureaucracy in favour 
of a system which places responsibility for the implementation of its programmes on the 
Governments of Member States”.99 Despite the manifest failures of decentralisation, the 
Council of Ministers reiterated this position in 1995.100 Two years earlier SADC’s 
Framework and Strategy document had identified clearly the difficulties associated with a 
decentralised integration strategy: unclear lines of authority and accountability; different 
standards, qualifications and performance criteria for government officials involved in 
managing regional programmes; and insufficient provision of staff and other resources for co-
ordinating these programmes.101 Ten years after its formation, SADC estimated that only 
twenty per cent of its 470 projects met the criteria for properly integrated regional projects, 
the rest being essentially national projects.102 Following a major organisational review, in 
2001 the Summit finally decided to centralise planning, co-ordination and implementation 
functions in the Secretariat. Significantly, though, it did not increase the powers and authority 
of the Executive Secretary in relation to the governing structures of the organisation. 103 
 
The general aversion to centralisation is probably linked to state concerns about loss of 
sovereignty. These concerns might also explain the specific resistance to centralised structures 
and the strong preference for informality in the areas of politics, defence and security: the 
ISDSC had no constitution and its secretariat rotated annually among member states; in 1996 
the ministers responsible for foreign affairs and defence proposed that the Organ should 
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operate in a flexible and informal manner;104 and the ministers who drafted the Organ 
Protocol decided that the Organ should not have a permanent secretariat and should not be 
linked to the SADC Secretariat.105 The preference for informality was motivated on the 
grounds that states should have freedom of action in political and security affairs and in crisis 
situations in particular. It was argued that the benefits of informal and flexible arrangements 
had been demonstrated by the Frontline States, whose presidents were able to communicate 
freely and quickly with each other in the absence of excessive bureaucracy and protocol.  
 
SADC’s objectives relating to security, defence and peacemaking are considerably more 
complex than the goals of the Frontline States. The absence of procedural and structural 
formality in these areas has contributed to an acute lack of organisational cohesion and 
continuity, confusion and disagreements over responsibilities and accountability, a failure to 
implement decisions and, at the most banal level, disputes over what was decided at previous 
meetings. In 1995 the author and a colleague argued that SADC’s informal arrangements on 
peace and security had serious shortcomings: they were not binding on states; they did not 
regulate state behaviour and responses to conflict in an agreed, consistent and predictable 
manner; and they might consequently break down in crises when they were needed most.106 
These concerns were justified by events in subsequent years. The Organ Protocol is intended 
to eliminate the problems but the extent to which it will do so is an open question.  
 
South Africa has not played the role of a regional hegemon and driven the integration project 
as many observers expected in light of its economic and military strength in the region. Thabo 
Mbeki has championed continental integration and institution-building through the African 
Union but devoted little attention to political and security integration in Southern Africa. 
Pretoria’s political efforts in the region have focused more on conflict resolution than on the 
strengthening of multilateral forums and programmes. Its lack of assertiveness might be due 
to its tensions with Zimbabwe, limited sway over its neighbours and sensitivity to fears that it 
would bully them, all of which factors are influenced by the apartheid regime’s regional 
aggression in the 1980s. Viewed objectively, moreover, South Africa is a developing country 
with a small economy and a relatively weak state.107 Given its regional strength and objective 
weakness, South Africa might believe that it has more to gain from economic and 
development co-operation with industrialised countries than with its neighbours.108 
 
Conclusion 
Some scholars in the realist school of international relations are wholly pessimistic about the 
utility of security regimes. John Mearsheimer, for example, insists that institutions (or 
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regimes) can do little if anything to enhance stability in an international system characterised 
by anarchy and a relentless competition for power and security among states; there is no 
evidence that regimes have an independent effect on state behaviour and constitute an 
important cause of peace.109 If this were true, why do states put so much effort into regional 
and global institutions whose goals include peace and stability? Mearsheimer addresses the 
puzzle only with respect to the US,110 shedding no light on the rationale of other states 
engaged in regime formation and development.111 One of the striking features of the Southern 
African case is that states persisted in their mission to create a security regime when there 
were good reasons to abandon it: they not only devoted scarce funds and much time to the 
Organ with little positive result, but their disputes over its status and orientation seriously 
damaged their relations. Their perseverance signifies their conviction that their interests 
would be served by a security regime. 
 
Driven by shared interests, SADC’s endeavour to create a security regime was constrained 
and undermined by the weakness of member states, their fear of diluting sovereignty and, 
most importantly, their lack of shared values. These interlinked and deep-rooted structural and 
political dynamics also inhibited effective peacemaking and are likely to impair the 
functioning of the Organ in the future. The optimistic prognosis of SADC’s security project in 
the early 1990s relied too much on the compelling external logic of a common security 
regime and paid too little attention to the internal logic of the regime. It overestimated the 
durability of the bonds forged during the liberation struggles and underestimated the import of 
the normative differences between states. The Southern African experience supports the 
general observation that common values, their codification into well-developed norms, and 
adherence by member states to these values and norms are key determinants in the success or 
otherwise of regional organisations.112  
 
Analysts who attribute the Organ impasse to the disagreements over its organisational status 
have focused on manifestations of the underlying problems. Rocky Williams argues that the 
preoccupation with security architecture is misplaced because the problem lies at the level of 
strategy. 113 He notes correctly that “structure should follow strategy” but this is only part of a 
broader equation: structure follows strategy; strategy follows objectives; objectives are shaped 
by values as well as interests; and the Organ breakdown occurred at the level of foundational 
values. This line of argument corresponds to the distinction drawn by Stephen Krasner 
between the principles and norms of an international regime on the one hand, and its rules and 
procedures on the other. Whereas the latter are components of a regime and can change 
without altering its essence, the former provide the basic defining characteristics of a regime. 
Fundamental political disputes among states over the nature of a regime are thus more 
concerned with its norms and principles than with its rules and procedures.114 This was true of 
the SADC Organ even if such disputes were not always expressed explicitly.  
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Williams maintains that the Organ malaise could be solved by forging a political consensus 
on SADC’s human security agenda and appropriate peacebuilding strategies; yet he also notes 
that SADC has already embraced this agenda in official documents.115 The truth of the matter 
is that these documents do not reflect a genuine consensus. Moreover, the proposal that states 
should forge a political consensus underestimates the nature of their differences. These 
differences cannot be bridged through negotiations and compromise. They relate to cardinal 
issues that define the essential political character of Southern African states. Agostinho 
Zacarias accepts that common values will not be attained without the transformation of these 
states and suggests that the Organ should spearhead their transformation by adopting a 
structure that ensures the promotion of democratic order, good governance and the economic 
and social dimensions of security. 116 The Organ has no power or authority to do anything of 
the kind. It is a forum of states, none of which will permit it to drive their transformation. The 
emergence of a strong security regime has been inhibited precisely by their apprehension 
about diluted sovereignty and interference in domestic affairs. 
 
The position held by Zacarias overstates what is possible at the regional level and understates 
what is required at the national level. This systemic tension lies at the heart of SADC’s 
difficulties in all its programmes. Its agenda is generally too ambitious, which is to say that 
the agenda is based on unrealistic organisational and political expectations of states. The core 
dilemma is that regional integration is an endeavour intended to strengthen states in various 
ways but Southern African states are in various ways too weak to undertake this endeavour 
successfully. The specific difficulties relating to the absence of common values, the weakness 
of states and their fear of diluted sovereignty are national problems that cannot be solved at 
the regional level. As a result, the challenge of common security in Southern Africa is 
primarily a national rather than a regional challenge.  
 
At conferences in Southern Africa it is often argued that political and security integration is a 
gradual process, which evolves over several decades, as in Europe, and that patience is 
therefore required in the relatively newer case of SADC. This argument neglects the salience 
of the internal logic of regional organisations. Common policies and mechanisms are only 
likely to evolve incrementally if member states are united around common values. Common 
values, on the other hand, depend on national policies that can change over time in the 
direction of either convergence or divergence. The OAU made little progress towards 
convergence over four decades, a period comparable with the development of the EU.  
 
Some degree of convergence in Southern Africa could occur in the future. The prevailing 
divisions are not immutable and national policies could change substantially as new 
governments are elected. The Organ might become more effective if it were driven 
energetically by a core group of democratic states that were willing to devote adequate 
resources to it, provide incentives for compliance with its norms, and put pressure on other 
states when required. The necessary composition and size of such a group is a matter of 
debate but it would have to include, at the very least, South Africa and a democratic 
Zimbabwe working with common purpose. 
 
The emergence of a security community is not on the horizon, however, and writers who 
claim that Southern Africa is moving in this direction are mistaken. They ignore or downplay 
the significance of the disputes around the Organ, the lack of trust among states and the extent 
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to which states deviate from the democratic and pacific norms espoused in official documents. 
More obviously, the claim is not sustainable in the light of extant and potential violence. In 
many Southern African countries there is no assurance that domestic conflict will be managed 
peacefully. Nor is there any assurance that inter-state conflict will be managed without resort 
to force. Indeed, the Organ Protocol indicates SADC’s acute awareness of the possibility of 
violence within and between states. Southern Africa is wracked by insecurity and it is 
struggling to become a political and security community.  
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